The Theory of Moral Sentiments Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages. by Adam Smith — Summary & Review

Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments offers a rich examination of how humans naturally form moral judgments and social bonds through sympathy—the capacity to share and understand others’ feelings by imaginatively placing ourselves in their situation. The book begins by defining sympathy broadly as fellow-feeling with any passion, not just sorrow, and explains how imagination enables us to conceive others’ emotions despite never directly experiencing them. Smith illustrates that sympathy arises both from perceiving others’ visible passions and from understanding their causes, though sympathy is often imperfect without knowledge of why someone feels as they do.

The work discusses how people seek sympathy especially for disagreeable passions like grief or resentment, and how mutual sympathy enlivens joy and alleviates sorrow. Approval of others’ passions depends on their concordance with our own feelings, and moral judgments involve assessing both the proportionality of passions to their causes (propriety) and the effects of actions (merit). Smith distinguishes between two sets of virtues: amiable virtues, which express tender sympathy and humanity, and respectable virtues, which involve dignified self-command and restraint of passions. Virtue is seen as an uncommon excellence beyond ordinary propriety, requiring both sensibility and self-control.

The text explores the social dynamics of passions, noting that bodily passions like hunger or pain elicit less sympathy than imaginative passions such as love or generosity. Unsocial passions like hatred and resentment divide sympathy and are socially disapproved when strongly expressed, while social passions like kindness and friendship evoke widespread approval. The desire for social approbation drives ambition, pursuit of wealth, and rank, but Smith cautions that these often sacrifice real tranquility and can lead to envy or contempt.

Using historical examples such as the fall of the King of Macedon, Smith reflects on the insupportable loss of public admiration and the stoical ideal of magnanimity—accepting all conditions with fortitude and propriety. He distinguishes merit and demerit as grounds for reward and punishment, rooted in gratitude and resentment, which themselves depend on sympathy with the agent’s motives and the feelings of beneficiaries or sufferers. Justice is highlighted as a social virtue enforceable by force, necessary to prevent harm and maintain order, while beneficence is a free virtue deserving praise but not punishment if lacking.

Smith also analyzes the complexity of moral judgment, emphasizing that intention is the proper basis for praise or blame, though human sentiments are often influenced by outcomes and fortune. He acknowledges the limits of human justice and the hope for divine justice to address hidden intentions. The impartial spectator—a conceptual internal judge formed by social experience—guides self-judgment, helping individuals assess their own conduct beyond mere public opinion. The sense of duty arises as a principle guiding conduct, sometimes independent of sentiment, and religion reinforces moral rules and social trust.

The work further discusses how utility bestows beauty on art, institutions, and character, distinguishing between approbation based on utility and that based on propriety. Custom and fashion shape aesthetic and moral judgments, influencing what is considered graceful or proper. Smith contrasts civilized and savage nations, noting differences in emotional expression, self-command, and virtue cultivation. He surveys major philosophical theories of virtue—propriety (harmony and moderation), prudence (self-interest and happiness), and benevolence (disinterested love)—critiquing systems that reduce virtue to vanity or self-interest.

Finally, Smith offers a detailed linguistic analysis of the origin and evolution of language, showing how humans moved from naming particular objects to inventing abstract terms and complex grammar. He reflects on how language simplification, while practical, can diminish expressive power and eloquence, paralleling the social shaping of moral sentiments.

Overall, the book combines philosophical reflection, psychological insight, historical example, and linguistic theory to reveal the delicate interplay of imagination, sympathy, reason, and social custom in shaping human morality and society.